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Departing from the gold standard was the necessary condition for early recovery from 
the Great Depression in 1930s (Eichengreen and Sachs[1985]). Then, was it the 
sufficient condition for an independent monetary policy? I explore Japan’s monetary 
policy during the interwar period, focusing on the macroeconomic policy innovation in 
the early 1930s. I explore the view of the Japanese policymakers at that time, making 
use of newly available archives from the Bank of Japan. I derive a new series of 
representative long-term interest rate data from the market price of one particular 
government bond. Then, I explore the relationship between long-term interest rates of 
Japan and the two financial centers, Great Britain and the United States. The 
Japanese experience shows how strong the Golden Fetters were during the 
post-gold-standard era. The institution of the gold standard had an enduring influence 
on Japanese policymakers, even after its constraints were no longer formally binding. 
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1. Introduction 
The international gold standard was regarded as the most sophisticated 
monetary institution before the First World War (WWI). London was the world financial 
center. Policymakers around the world followed “the rules of the game” of the gold 
standard to keep the gold parity. And the efforts by the policymakers strengthened the 
international monetary system as a whole. 
The situation changed after WWI. Money did not flow from creditor countries 
to debtor countries as before. After the suspension of the gold standard during WWI, the 
policymakers tried to restore the gold standard. Their efforts did not succeed and ended 
up with the Great Depression. In retrospect, the policymakers were obsessed by the 
Golden Fetters (Eichengreen [1995]). 
Departing from the gold standard was the necessary condition for early 
recovery from the Great Depression in 1930s (Eichengreen and Sachs[1985]). Then, was 
it the sufficient condition for independent monetary policy? In this study, the case for 
Japan shows that the answer was NO. The Japanese experience shows how strong the 
Golden Fetters were during the post-gold-standard era. The institution of the gold 
standard had an enduring influence on Japanese policymakers, even after its 
constraints were no longer formally binding.1 
Japan’s economic policy during the interwar period was strongly influenced by 
both the gold standard and the Great Depression. Japan joined the gold standard in 
October 1897. Japan suspended the gold standard in September 1917, following the 
Western countries. Japan tried to return to the gold standard in the 1920s, and finally 
                                                  
1  This study is complement to Eichengreen [1995] in a sense. He views the gold 
standard system as a kind of decentralized cooperation mechanism with inherent 
vulnerability. He describes the Great Depression as a case for the vulnerability came 
real. His study focuses mainly on the core countries though he mentioned some 
peripheral countries including Japan. This study is an attempt to explore how a 
peripheral country looked at and responded to the collapse of the system.  3
did so in January 1930. Japan departed from the gold standard in December 1931 under 
the leadership of Korekiyo Takahashi, who returned to the Finance Minister position, in 
the midst of the Great Depression. 
Many observers argue that Takahashi brought new policy institutions. They 
are impressed by economic policies conducted by Takahashi and his colleagues in the 
early 1930s. Some claim that Takahashi intuitively understood the mechanism of the 
Keynesian policy before Keynes’ seminal work of General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money in 1936, and virtually carried out Keynesian policies without any 
contact with Keynes and his colleagues.2 Some argue that Takahashi’s three-pronged 
economic stimulus package, depreciation of the yen, expansion of government spending, 
and lowering of interest rates, contributed to the early recovery of the Japanese 
economy from the Great Depression (Nakamura [1971], Patrick [1971]). Some argue 
that Takahashi’s era was the turning point of policy regime from laissez-faire to active 
interventions and strict control of the national economy by the government in Japan 
(Miwa [1982], Ito [1989]).   
There are only a few previous studies employing quantitative analyses on 
Takahashi’s economic policies. Nanto and Takagi [1985] stress the effects of the 
increase in exports accompanying the depreciation of the yen. Cha [2003] emphasizes 
the effects of the debt-financed fiscal expansion. Yet, very few have focused on the 
developments of monetary policy during Takahashi’s era. Most previous studies have 
been constrained by the lack of data and historical materials when conducting empirical 
research on monetary policy in the interwar Japan. 
I explore Japan’s monetary policy during the interwar period by focusing on the 
macroeconomic policy innovation in the early 1930s. I explore the contemporary view of 
                                                  
2  Kindleberger [1973], pp.166-167. I define the Keynesian policy as a discretionary 
macroeconomic policy either on the monetary or fiscal side associated with a managed 
currency system.  4
the Japanese policymakers at that time, making use of newly available archives from 
the Bank of Japan (BOJ). I derive a new series of representative long-term interest rate 
data from the market price of one kind of government bond to overcome the data 
constraints. And I explore the relationship between long-term interest rates of Japan 
and the two financial centers, Britain and the United States. 
 
2. Macroeconomic Policy Trilemma 
Obstfeld and Taylor [1997, 2004] utilize the concept of the macroeconomic 
policy trilemma in historical studies of a number of countries’ monetary policies. They 
claim that a chosen macroeconomic policy regime can only succeed in at most two out of 
three goals: 
1) full freedom of cross-border capital movements, 
2) a fixed exchange rate, 
3) independent monetary policy oriented toward domestic objectives. 
They argue that the gold standard is the typical case of maintaining free 
capital movements and a fixed exchange rate, while sacrificing independent monetary 
policy. They also argue that national policymakers became more inclined to controlling 
international capital flows after the financial upheavals of the Great Depression.3 
Kindleberger describe the essence of Takahashi’s economic policies as deficit 
financing with the flexible exchange rates.4 Kindleberger’s notion presumes that if the 
Japanese policymakers decided to pursue an independent monetary policy which 
enabled deficit financing, they should also move to the flexible exchange rate system.5 
Interwar Japan was a typical small and open economy, and its economic 
                                                  
3  Komiya and Suda [1983] look at the postwar Japan’s choices of monetary policy 
regime and exchange rate system in the same context. 
4  Kindleberger [1973], p.166. 
5  In the same context, Hamilton [1988] claims that the government’s commitment to 
fiscal soundness and monetary stability was the essential part of the gold standard.  5
policies were subject to international conditions. The question is; were the Japanese 
policymakers, including Takahashi, free from the influence of the fixed exchange rate 
system? A flexible exchange rate system might not have been applicable to 
post-gold-standard Japan as it was a small and open economy. If so, how did Takahashi 
and his colleagues bring a quick and robust recovery in the midst of the Great 
Depression? I will try to answer these questions in the remainder of this paper by 
employing narrative and quantitative analyses. 
 
3. Some Basic Facts 
  I will now review some related events, focusing on the return to and departure 
from the gold standard. Then, I will look at macroeconomic indicators.   
Japan lifted the gold embargo and effectively resumed convertibility of the yen 
on January 11, 1930. Japan was the last of the gold club member countries to return to 
gold standard after World War I. Japan imposed the gold embargo again and effectively 
departed from the gold standard on December 13, 1931. The day of Japanese departure 
was about 3 months after the British departure, and the first day that Takahashi 
became Finance Minister again. Takahashi served as Finance Minister, except for a few 
months, until February 26, 1936, when he was assassinated by a group of militarists.6 
Japan stayed the gold standard for less than 2 years. The period of de jure gold 
standard for interwar Japan was shorter than any other gold club members.7 That  does 
not mean, however, that Japan was free from the enduring influence of the gold 
standard in the pre- and post-gold standard period. 
  Figure 1 shows the developments in the yen rate to the pound-sterling and to 
                                                  
6  He once resigned on the cabinet resignation in July 1934, and came back in office in 
November of the year. 
7  The second shortest next to Japan is Switzerland, which stayed on gold for 3 years 
and 2 months (August 1928-September 1931), and the third is Norway, which stayed on 
gold for 3 years and 5 months (May 1928-September 1931). Bank of Japan [1997].  6
the dollar. It confirms the commitment to the par rate during de jure gold standard. It 
also suggests efforts by Japanese government to stabilize the yen at around the 
pre-WWI par rate during the pre-gold standard period. It highlights the sharp decline 
right after the departure from the gold standard. The yen depreciated by 40 percent vis 
à vis the pound-sterling from the old parity rate when the rate was stabilized again at 
the new level in the beginning of 1933.   
I should note that for Japan, departing from the gold standard did not 
necessarily mean moving to a flexible exchange rate system. Rather, it meant a one-shot 
devaluation under a fixed exchange rate system. As a small open economy, Japan had 
good economic reasons to peg: to settle its trade account and to give relief to 
international investors.8 Also, Japan had a good political reason to return to and stay 
on the gold standard. One of the criteria for participating in the establishment of Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) in 1929 was to have a “stable currency.”9 
Figure 2 shows the developments in prices of goods and stocks from January 
1928 through December 1936. Commodity prices declined in 1930 and 1931. Compared 
to the end of 1928, the wholesale price index fell by 39 percent, and the retail price index 
fell by 31 percent by October 1931. Prices of goods rebounded in the first half of 
Takahashi’s term and were stable for the remainder of his term. 
Stock prices dropped before the return to gold and stagnated during the gold 
standard period. They rebounded during Takahashi’s term. The Oriental Economist 
                                                  
8  Previously issued Japanese external bonds matured in January 1931. The bonds were 
issued in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War and denominated in the pound-sterling. 
Before the Japanese returning to gold, the Western investors insisted that the stable 
currency of Japan was prerequisite for the debt conversion. Japan successfully issued 
refinancing bonds in May 1930, after returning to gold. 
9  In the negotiation in the Young Committee, “the stable currency” referred to keeping 
gold parity. Japan succeeded to include an exceptional clause for a victorious county to 
be able to participate without referring to the stable currency clause. Still, Japanese 
negotiators regarded joining to and staying on the gold standard as a source of power 
within BIS. Cho [2001], p.100.  7
Stock Price Index peaked in July 1928, fell by 64 percent by October 1930, and 
stagnated afterwards until the end of 1931. It surged during the first half of 
Takahashi’s term, and regained its 1928 peak level by the beginning of 1934. 
Figure 3 shows the developments in interest rates. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
kept its official discount rate (ODR) at 5.48 percent through 1928-29, and reduced the 
rate to 5.11 percent in October 1930. After the British departure from gold in September 
1931, BOJ raised the rate twice to 6.57 percent through the end of the year to suppress 
capital outflow. 
After departing from the gold standard, BOJ reduced the rate three times in 
1932 and once in 1933. The rate fell to an unprecedented low of 3.65 percent from July 
1933 through the end of Takahashi’s term.10  
I should note that interest rates in private sector were higher than the ODR 
and more or less uncorrelated with the ODR. That may have reflected high credit risk 
premium on private debts under the financial instability in interwar Japan. I will 
return to this point later in this paper. 
    Figure 4 shows the developments in monetary aggregates. “Cash in 
circulation” (the definition close to M1) peaked in August 1929 and dropped by 26 
percent by June 1931. It rebounded during Takahashi’s term.11 Increase in money 
during Takahashi’s term was consistent with fall in interest rates, reflecting easy 
monetary policy. 
  In general, macroeconomic indicators show signs of contraction during the 
period on gold and signs of recovery during Takahashi’s term. 
                                                  
10  BOJ further lowered the rate to 3.29 percent in April 1936 after the assassination of 
Takahashi. 
11  From September 1931, BOJ began to report monthly data of “bank deposits” and 
“bank lending” at the biannual Meetings of Directors and Branch Managers. “Bank 
deposits” shows similar developments with “cash in circulation.” It is presumable that 
reporting of “bank deposits” itself reflects BOJ’s attempts for maintaining price stability 
without the anchor of gold.  8
 
4. Narrative Analyses 
I will now explore the views of the Japanese policymakers at that time, 
especially at BOJ. I make use of newly available materials from the BOJ Archive, 
including the minutes of the biannual Meetings of Directors and Branch Managers.12 
The narrative analyses illustrate the enduring influence of the gold standard 
on policy. The analyses suggest that Japanese policymakers were not free from the 
Golden Fetters before returning to, and even after departing from, the gold standard. 
The policymakers sacrificed monetary policy autonomy in order to stabilize the 
exchange rate and to maintain free capital movements under de jure gold standard. The 
policymakers also did the same thing during the suspension period of the gold standard 
in 1920s. The policymakers had a “fear of floating” after departing from the gold 
standard in December 1931.   
 
(1) The Period of the Suspended Gold Standard (1919-1929) 
  BOJ Archive materials show that Japanese policymakers intended to return to 
the gold standard eventually, but for various reasons held back from doing so in a hurry. 
Incidents such as the Great Kanto Earthquake in September 1923 and the Financial 
Panic in spring of 1927, hinder the government’s final decision. 
  When Britain returned to gold standard in April 1925, Osachi Hamaguchi of 
Kensei-Kai Party was Finance Minister.13 He claimed that, in commenting on the 
British action, “We wish to follow them immediately, since that is on the right track of 
                                                  
12  BOJ Archives became open to the public in 2002, but some of the documents were 
published by BOJ before that. 
13  Both of Kensei-Kai (later Minsei-To) and Seiyu-Kai parties supported returning to 
the gold standard. Kensei-Kai was more active in promoting the preparation measures 
such as tight money and balanced budget, but the difference was only a matter of 
nuance. Cho [2001], p.101.  9
the gold standard. Unfortunately, we cannot do so right now because our conditions 
today do not allow it.”14 
  In January 1928, Finance Minister Chuzo Mitsuchi of Seiyu-Kai Cabinet 
announced that conditions were improving. He said, “We see good progress in business 
and financial restructuring since the Financial Panic of last spring. . . The balance of 
payments is improving. Exchange rates are steady reflecting favorable fundamentals 
without any artificial measures.”15 
  On July 2, 1929, Seiyu-Kai Cabinet resigned and Hamaguchi of Minsei-to 
Party (ex-Kensei-Kai) came to power. The Hamaguchi cabinet was committed to early 
lifting of the gold embargo. Former BOJ Governor Junnosuke Inoue joined the cabinet 
as Finance Minister. 
  On August 28, Prime Minister Hamaguchi distributed a leaflet to all families 
in Japan, and made a radio speech about the gold standard. In the leaflet, he said, “I 
believe that our country should lift the gold embargo immediately and get back on the 
right track of the international economy. . . To prepare for this, we must tighten our 
public and private economies as much as possible to decrease prices and imports. . . We 
should shrink today to grow tomorrow.”16 
  On November 21, Hamaguchi announced, “With all the internal and external 
preparation completed, I am now convinced that there are no economic obstacles to 
lifting the gold embargo. I order the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to lift the gold embargo, 
effective on January 11, 1930.”17 
                                                  
14  “Statement by Finance Minister Osachi Hamaguchi,” Miyako Shinbun, April 30, 
1925, reprinted in Bank of Japan [1968], pp.390-391. 
15  “Address by Finance Minister Chuzo Mitsuchi,” Parliamentary Paper, House of 
Representatives, January 21, 1928, reprinted in Bank of Japan [1968], pp.83-84. 
16  “Zen-Kokumin-ni Uttau” (Call upon All the People), August 28, 1929, reprinted in 
Bank of Japan [1968], pp.395-396. 
17  “Kin-Kaikin-ni Saisite” (On Lifting of the Gold Embargo), November 21, 1929, 
reprinted in Bank of Japan [1968], pp.396-397.  10
 
(2) The Period on Gold (1930-1931) 
  On January 11, 1930, Japan returned to the gold standard, and stayed on gold 
for 1 year and 11 months. The BOJ Archive materials show that Japanese policymakers 
clearly sacrificed monetary policy autonomy to maintain gold parity and capital 
mobility.  
BOJ Governor Hisaakira Hijikata spoke at the Spring Meeting of BOJ 
Directors and Branch Managers on May 11, 1931. At that time, his main concern was 
how to keep external balance and exchange rate parity, and he felt no responsibility for 
the domestic economy. He said, “I cannot commit to improving business conditions in 
Japan’s current domestic climate. I can say nothing more than to expect gradual 
improvement with more efforts by business community. I expect little effects of policy 
measures for now. . . Exchange rates are generally stable around the par level even in 
the season of the year in which volume of imports tend to mount. . . I don’t expect large 
specie outflows in the future. . . I expect the balance of payments of fiscal 1931 to be 
balanced or at a small deficit.”18 
Britain abandoned the convertibility of pound-sterling on September 21, 1931, 
and Japan stayed on gold for 3 months more. BOJ tried to suppress capital outflows to 
support the gold standard. Market participants anticipated that Japan would follow 
Britain, inducing massive capital outflows. BOJ raised the ODR twice on October 6 and 
on November 5. This was the classical gold standard adjustment for a central bank 
facing capital outflow (Bagehot [1873]). 
The Research Department of BOJ submitted a report dated October 13, 1931 to 
the Fall Meeting of Directors and Branch Managers. It stated, “The British departure 
                                                  
18  “Documents on the biannual Meetings of Directors and Branch Managers, 
Spring-Fall, 1931,” BOJ Archive No.3942.  11
from the gold standard triggered other countries to be suspect each other… Rumors 
floated in London and the European Continent. The rumors suggested that Japan also 
might impose a gold embargo. . .We have been forced to ship substantial amount of 
specie abroad. . . BOJ, responsible for maintaining the gold standard and for 
maintaining specie, has followed the normal principles under such internal and 
external circumstances, and raised the rate.”19 
Eigo Fukai, a distinguished economist and then Vice Governor of BOJ, later 
wrote in his memoirs, “In retrospect, it would have been sensible for Japan to depart 
from the gold standard immediately because the British departure was a change in 
global situation. . . But Japan held still enough specie, even though it had lost some 
after the lifting of gold embargo. The trade balance had improved, and the balance of 
payments was in equilibrium. Considering this, we concluded that it was possible to 
stay on gold as a matter of pure monetary policy.”20 
Fukai’s memoirs suggest the contagious aspect of the British financial crisis. 
Japan was in a vulnerable position in the international finance. If things went normally, 
there might be no problem. But, the British financial crisis triggered the capital flight 
from Japan within the chain-reaction toward the collapse of the international gold 
standard. 
 
(3) The Period after the Gold Standard (1932-1938) 
  Fukai wrote in his memoirs that he gave four pieces of advice to the returning 
Finance Minister Takahashi on December 13, 1931, the day of Takahashi’s 
appointment.21 
                                                  
19  “Documents on the biannual Meetings of Directors and Branch Managers, 
Spring-Fall, 1931,” BOJ Archive No.3942. 
20  Fukai [1941], pp.251-252. 
21  According to Fukai’s memoirs, the resigning Finance Minister Inoue consulted Fukai 
about the transition of foreign exchange arrangements on December 11. Then, Fukai  12
1) impose a gold embargo immediately, 
2) abandon gold convertibility of the yen with an emergency imperial decree as soon 
as possible, 
3) conduct a prudent monetary policy to control the money supply in absence of the 
gold standard’s controls in order to maintain the value of currency, 
4) take the required legal actions to control foreign exchange transactions if these 
were necessary. 
  Fukai got a mixed response from Takahashi. Takahashi resisted the second 
point of abandoning the gold convertibility, while totally agreeing with the first and 
third points of immediate gold embargo and prudent monetary policy. Fukai was 
surprised by Takahashi’s resistance on the second point. Fukai surmised, “Mr. 
Takahashi seemed to want to avoid cutting a formal linkage between gold and the 
currency.” Takahashi was indifferent about the forth point of foreign exchange control.22  
  The Capital Flight Prevention Law was proclaimed on July 1, 1932, and came 
into effect on the same day. Under the law, the government reserved the power to 
impose restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. 
A MOF official explained that international capital movements were still free 
in principle and that capital controls were regarded as exceptional under the Capital 
Flight Prevention Law. Kazuo Aoki, the Chief of Treasury Division, Financial Bureau of 
MOF, said in an explanatory session in the Diet, “We will secure the freedom of 
international capital flow in principle.”23 
                                                                                                                                                  
discussed on the issue with MOF, Yokohama Specie Bank and other BOJ officials. 
Fukai met Takahashi at around 3 pm. on December 13, and Takahashi assumed the 
office of Finance Minister in the evening of the day. Fukai act as one of primary policy 
adviser to Takahashi throughout Takahashi’s term. Those episodes indicate Fukai’s 
close ties with two Finance Ministers and his key role in the policy transition. Fukai 
[1941], pp.255-259. 
22  Fukai [1941], pp.260-263. 
23  Osaka Bankers Association [1932], pp.107-108.  13
BOJ Archive materials show that contemporary policymakers at that time 
were aware of the macroeconomic policy trilemma. Tetsuzo Horikoshi, an executive 
director of BOJ, spoke about the Capital Flight Prevention Law at the Fall Meeting of 
Directors and Branch Managers in 1932.24 He said that the purpose of the Law was to 
give the government the power to regulate foreign exchange transactions. He said, “If 
money increases by domestic policies, the exchange rate may fall. If we intend to 
maintain the exchange rate, we should curb our domestic policy. If we dare to pursue 
the domestic policy, we should sacrifice the exchange rate. We face risk with the gold 
embargo only. We should bring the equilibrium of balance of payments to stabilize the 
exchange rate. We may need some measure for balancing the balance of payments.” 
  Horikoshi expressed “fear of floating” in the speech, mentioning BOJ’s concern 
for capital flight. He said, “The primary concern for this country (at the time of lifting 
the gold embargo) was if the domestic investors would rush to foreign securities, 
inducing massive capital outflows, in the event of declining values of Japanese overseas 
bonds. BOJ advised the government to prepare for regulating these capital outflows.” 
Horikoshi suggested little contradiction between Japanese domestic policy 
objectives and international capital flows in the current condition, and he indicated no 
urgent need for tight regulations to avoid capital outflows. He said, “So far, we have 
been managing with this formula. I don’t know if this kind of formula will be enough if 
things change in future. We might have to impose tighter regulations such as foreign 
exchange controls.”   
  The Foreign Exchange Control Law was proclaimed on March 29, 1933 and 
came into effect on May 1 of the year. Under the law, the regulations on foreign 
exchange transactions were substantially extended and tightened. Almost all the 
                                                  
24  “Documents on the biannual Meetings of Directors and Branch Managers, 
Spring-Fall, 1932,” BOJ Archive No.3943.  14
transactions related to international capital flows were subject to regulation. At the 
same time, speculations on foreign exchange were forbidden by finance ministry 
ordinance.  
Some narrative materials suggest that those laws and related actions by the 
authorities reduced international capital mobility. Takahashi spoke at the Bills 
Exchange Association Meeting on April 21, 1933. He said, “The government has 
established the measures to prevent domestic capital from flowing out of control. Now, 
we are able to pursue low interest rate policy to the full extent.”25 Fukai later noted, 
“The measures actually adopted for exchange control were of a mild in nature; but a 
declaration by the Government in November, 1932, that it was determined to enforce 
drastic measures in case of need proved decisive.”26 
  We cannot be sure from narrative evidence how strong the need for the foreign 
exchange control was, and how effective the control was. In this regard, quantitative 
analyses are supplementary to the narrative analyses. 
 
5. Constructing A Series of Long-Term Interest Rate Data 
(1) Previously Available Interest Rate Data 
Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor [2004] use interest rates on bills discounted 
by banks and bills issued by the government (typically, treasury bills) to explore the 
relationship of countries’ short term rates, including Japanese ones. In their analysis, 
Japan appears to be an outlier. Their analysis indicates that interest rates in peripheral 
countries moved together with those in the center country during the interwar period, 
implying that peripheral countries’ monetary policies were more or less dependent on 
the center country. Their analysis suggests that Japanese interest rates had a weaker 
                                                  
25  “Speech by Finance Minister Takahashi at the Bills Exchange Association Meeting,” 
Osaka Bankers Association [1933], No. 429, pp.17-25. 
26  Fukai [1937], p.392.  15
relationship with those of center country than did those of other peripheral countries.   
The reported results of weak relationship of Japanese interest rates with those 
of the center country may be due to inadequate data. Previously available short-term 
interest rate data for the interwar period in Japan were those for private sector debts 
such as bills discounted at banks or certificates of lending of banks.27 Those interest 
rates were subject to a high credit risk premium. The Japanese economy suffered from 
periodical financial panics and financial instability in the interwar period, and private 
debts were subject to high credit risk.   
Figure 5 reports short-term interest rates in private sectors in Japan, Britain 
and the United States. Apparently, Japanese rates moved differently from the others, 
while British and American rates moved along with each other. Especially, Japanese 
rates were higher than the other two rates in the middle of 1920s and 1930s.   
Table 1 shows the results of unit root tests for short-term interest rates on 
private sector debts in the three countries. I employ Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
tests and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. The results suggest the difference in time-series 
properties between the short-term interest rates in Japan and in the other two 
countries. The tests reject the existence of a unit root for Japan, indicating stationality, 
while failing to reject the existence of a unit root for Britain and the United States, 
indicating non-stationarity.28 There are no representative short-term interest rates on 
public debt in the interwar Japan such as treasury-bill rates to substitute for the 
existing data.29  
                                                  
27  The interest rates for “bills discounted” and “certificates of lending” were reported by 
Tokyo Bankers Association. Their maturities varied, and they were often refinanced on 
maturity. According to Aoki [1932], the average maturities in 1927 were about 2 months 
for bills discounted and 8 months for certificates of lending (Aoki [1932], p.45). It is 
often claimed that certificates of lending included various kinds of lending with higher 
risk and less liquidity than bills discounted. Sano [1936], p.8. 
28  To be precise, I get some mixed results. PP test for Britain fails to reject the existence 
of a unit root, while ADF test reject it at 5 percent level of significance. 
29  Treasury bills were issued occasionally during the interwar period. But, they were  16
There are, however, long-term interest data for government bonds. Nippon 
Kangyo Ginko (Japan Hypothec Bank) collected the price data for bonds, and calculated 
compound yields to maturity of the bonds. The series begins only from July 1921, and 
the data is calculated only for the first working day of each month. Appropriate interest 
rate data for Japan are needed to explore the international relationship of interest 
rates. 
 
(2) A New Series of Long-term Interest Rates 
I have created a new series of long-term interest rate data. I derived it from the 
market prices of a government bond called “Ko-go” 5 percent government bond.30 I use 
the price data of the “Ko-go” at spot transactions of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). I 
calculate compound yields to maturity on monthly average prices from January 1919 to 
December 1938.31 32 
During the interwar period, investors traded various types of bonds, including 
government bonds, municipal bonds and corporate bonds, both in the official markets 
and over the counter of securities companies. TSE served as the central market of 
Japan. In November 1932, TSE listed 37 issues of Japanese government bonds, 1 issue 
of foreign (Chinese) government bond, 95 issues of municipal bonds and 463 issues of 
corporate bonds at its spot transactions. 
For two reasons, the interest rates on government bonds are important for the 
                                                                                                                                                  
circulated for short time and the availability of the interest rate data was limited. 
30  “Ko-go” 5 percent bond was issued in 1908-09 after 17 big private railway companies 
were nationalized in 1906-07. It was delivered to stockholders of previous railway 
companies. The maturity date was in 1962-63. 
31  I use the “yield” function of excel spreadsheets. The monthly average price means the 
sum of traded values of bonds divided by the sum of traded quantities of bonds in a 
month. 
32  I compare the results of my calculation with that of the previously available Nippon 
Kangyo Ginko data. Nippon Kangyo Ginko did not publish the process of calculation. So, 
I calculate the yield at the same day and for the same bond as theirs, and the 
discrepancies are less than 1 basis point (a hundredth of 1 percent).  17
analyses on monetary policy during the interwar period in Japan. First, the interest 
rates on government bonds are credit-risk-free interest rates which are comparable to 
other countries’ interest rates. The rates on government bonds do not contain credit risk 
premium. In this regard, Interest rates on government bonds are different from other 
available interest rate series such as bills discounted or certificates of lending. Second, 
they were policy target rates for Japanese policymakers in the 1930s. 33 Fukai later 
observed Japanese monetary policy in the early 1930s as “Lowering interest rates on 
government bonds was essential to lower interest rates in general.” 34 The BOJ in the 
1930s regarded the open market operation of government bonds as one of its primary 
policy measures. 
I have used “Ko-go” 5 percent government bond for deriving the representative 
long-term interest rate during the interwar period in Japan because investors regarded 
the “Ko-go” as the benchmark issue. The “Ko-go” was the most-actively-traded bond 
during the interwar Japan. Trading in the “Ko-go” accounted for 18 percent of the total 
number of transactions in government bonds at TSE in 1932.   
 
6. Econometric Analyses 
Using government bond data, I will now explore the relationship between 
long-term interest rates of Japan and two international financial centers, Great Britain 
and the Unites States.35  I extend the approach taken by Obstfeld and Taylor [2004] and 
                                                  
33  Theoretically, long-term interest rates are sum of the average of short-term interest 
rates in future, and the term premium. It is another issue to be explored how effectively 
a central bank is able to control long-term interest rates even if it enjoys the 
independent monetary policy from abroad. I just add that today’s central bankers have 
big concern over developments in long-term interest rates, too. 
34  Fukai [1941], p.365. 
35  Long-term interest rate data for Britain and United States, which I use in this study, 
are monthly averages. The data for Britain are obtained from the NBER Macrohistory 
Database (http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/). The original data for 
Britain are from Board of Trade, Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom. The data 
for United States are from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking  18
Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor [2004], using the degree of co-movements of domestic 
and international interest rates as the indicator of sacrificing independent monetary 
policy. 
 
(1) Time-series Properties of the Long-term Interest Rates 
I examine the basic time-series properties of long-term interest rates in three 
countries. Figure 6 shows developments in the long-term interest rates from January 
1919 to December 1938.   
Table 2 reports the results of unit root tests for the long-term interest rates in 
the three countries. The results indicate that the order of integration of the long-term 
interest rates of the three countries is all one.36  
I employ Granger causality tests on the interest rates in the three countries 
with the formula (1).   
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t R  denotes the domestic interest rate at time t, and t Fj R ,  denotes the foreign country’s 
interest rate at time t (j=1,2). 
Table 3 reports the results of Granger causality tests. The results are 
consistent with the conventional arguments on the interwar Japan as a small and open 
economy. The results indicate that movements in lagged foreign interest rates are 
statistically significant in explaining movements in current Japanese interest rates. 
Japanese long-term interest rates are Granger-caused by both of British and American 
rates with a lag of one month. Neither of British nor American long-term interest rates 
is Granger-caused by Japanese rates with a lag of one month. That is consistent with 
                                                                                                                                                  
and Monetary Statistics, 1943, p.429 and pp.468-471. 
36  To be precise, ADF test fails to reject the existence of a unit root for Japan, while PP 
test rejects it at 10 percent level of significance.  19
the notion that Japan was a peripheral country. 
All of three countries’ interest rates are Granger-caused by each other with 
lags of more than two month. That is consistent with the conventional understanding 
that the international financial market was integrated. 
 
(2) Preparatory Tests for examining the Long-run Relationship 
I examine the long-run relationship, defined as cointegration, in the interest 
rates of Japan and the two international financial centers. Table 4 reports the results of 
cointegration tests presented by Engle and Granger [1987]. It indicates that the 
Japanese long-term interest rates were cointegrated with the British ones through the 
interwar period. This result implies that the Japanese rates hold a stable long-run level 
relationship with the British ones. It indicates no such relationship between the 
Japanese rates and the American ones. This result implies that the Japanese rates hold 
no such a stable long-run level relationship with the American ones. 
Gregory and Hansen [1996] argue that a simple cointegration test fails to 
detect cointegration in case of a structural change in the long-run level relationship 
between variables. I conduct cointegration tests with a structural change presented by 
Gregory and Hansen [1996],  for the relationship between Japanese and American 
long-term interest rates. Table 5 reports the results. It indicates that the Japanese 
long-term interest rates were cointegrated with the American ones during the interwar 
period, and that there was a structural change in the relationship from around the end 
of 1932 or the beginning of 1933. 
Table 4 also reports the result of the cointegration test between Japanese and 
British short-term interest rates on bills discounted at private banks. It indicates no 
cointegrating relationship between the Japanese short-term interest rates and the  20
British ones.37 
 
(3) Error Correction Models 
An error correction model is applicable when there is a cointegrating 
relationship among a set of variables. The model describes the behavior of the variables 
to converge to the cointegrating relationship, a long-run equilibrium. In the model, the 
cointegration term is called the error correction term. 
I formulate error correction models which explain the difference of Japanese 
long-term interest rates by lag-difference terms38 and an error correction term.39 The 
formula is expressed by equation (2). 
() ∑∑
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t R  denotes the domestic interest rate at time t, and  t b R ,  denotes the international 
base rate at time t. Table 6 reports the regression results.   
Obstfeld and Taylor [2004] and Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor [2004] argue 
that the cointegrating slope coefficient, θ , represents the long-term level relationship 
between the domestic interest rate and the international base rate. The expected sign of 
θ  is positive. If the domestic interest rate moves parallel with the international base 
rate, then,  1 = θ . They also argue that the absolute value of the coefficient of error 
correction term, or the adjustment speed, ω , represents the degree of dependency of 
the domestic interest rate towards the international base rate.40 
                                                  
37  It is arguable to test the cointegration between these two series, since the unit root 
tests indicate that Japanese short-term interest rate series is stationary, or I(0), and 
that British short-term interest rate series is non-stationary, or I(1). I report the results 
of the cointegration tests for the comparison between short- and long-term interest 
rates. 
38  Lag orders are chosen by Schwarz information criteria. 
39  Cointergrating vectors are calculated by the dynamic OLS method proposed by Stock 
and Watson [1993]. Lag orders are chosen by Schwarz information criteria. 
40  They employ the method developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith [2001] (PSS test) for 
testing the significance of the level relationship among a large set of country data. Since  21
First, I use British interest rate as the international base rate. I conduct two 
patterns of regressions regarding lag structure. In the formula reported in the first 
column, a), I use the same lag pattern as Obstfeld and Taylor [2004] and Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh, and Taylor [2004]. Their formula includes the difference of the base rate in 
time t ( t b R , ∆ ) in explanatory variables.41  In the formula reported in the second column, 
b), I use the lag pattern used in a standard error correction formula, which does not 
include the difference of the base rate in time t ( t b R , ∆ ) in explanatory variables. 
  Different lag patterns give qualitatively the same results. The coefficient 1 γ  is 
not statistically significant. Other coefficients are statistically significant and have the 
expected signs. The statistical significance of  0 γ  indicates the immediate impact on 
Japanese interest rates of British rates. The cointegrating slope coefficient, θ , is 
statistically significant, confirming the long-term level relationship between Japanese 
and British interest rates. The coefficient of error correction term or the adjustment 
speed,  ω , has the absolute value of .07, indicating that the half-life of the initial 
disturbing shock to the long-run relationship is 9 to 10 months. 
Second, I use American interest rate as the international base rate. I conduct 
the same regression as British rate, of which result is reported in the third column, c). I 
should note that the result in column c) has to be taken with a reservation because the 
cointegration tests support the existence of structural change in the long-run 
relationship. 
Both of  0 γ  and  1 γ  are not statistically significant in column c).42 That 
                                                                                                                                                  
the orders of integration in the data for Japan, Britain and the United States are all 1, I 
do not employ PSS test and directly estimate the error correction model. 
41  I assume that Japanese interest rates do not have influence on British rates because 
Japan was a small economy, and that there are no simultaneous biases. That 
assumption is also applied in Obstfeld and Taylor [2004] and Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and 
Taylor [2004]. 
42  The result of the formula without the difference of the base rate in time t ( t b R , ∆
) in  22
indicates weak responses in Japanese interes t  r a t e  t o  A m e r i c a n  r a t e  i n  t h e  s h o r t  
horizon. Other coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected signs. The 
coefficient of error correction term or the adjustment speed,  ω , has the absolute value 
of .06, indicating that the half-life of the initial disturbing shock to the long-run 
relationship is 12 months.   
I also conduct a regression including dummy variables in the error correction 
term, because cointegration tests indicate the existence of a structural change. The 
formula is expressed by equation (3).   
[] () ∑∑
==





t t t b t b t t j t b j j t j t u D R R R D R R R
10
1 , 1 , 1 , , θ θ σ σ ω γ β α (3) 
t D   has a value of zero before and in December 1932, and a value of one afterwards.   
The result with the dummy variables is reported in the fourth column, d). Both 
of  0 γ  and  1 γ  are not statistically significant. Other coefficients are statistically 
significant and have the expected signs. The coefficient of error correction term or the 
adjustment speed,  ω , has the absolute value of .012, indicating that the half-life of the 
initial disturbing shock to the long-run relationship is 5 months. 
The dummy variable for the cointegrating slope coefficient,  Π θ , is statistically 
significant, indicating a change in long-term relationship between Japanese and 
American interest rates at the end of 1932. According to the regression result, the value 
of the cointegrating slope coefficient before and in December 1932,  θ , is .253, and that 
after January 1933,  Π +θ θ , is .077. That indicates the level relationship between 
Japanese and American interest rates weakened at the end of 1932. 
The cointegrating slope coefficients for American interest rate before and after 
the end of 1932 are smaller than that for British rate. The adjustment speed of 
Japanese interest rate to the disturbance in the American rate is higher than in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
explanatory variables is not reported. The result is similar to that reported in column c).  23
British rate if one assumes the structural change in the level relationship. 
 
(4) Interpretation and Discussion 
  The quantitative analyses complement the narrative ones. The quantitative 
analyses indicate that Japanese long-term interest rate held a long-run relationship 
with British rate through the interwar period. The Japanese long-term interest rate 
held a long-run relationship also with American rate, but the relationship was 
weakened at around the end of 1932 or the beginning of 1933.   
The existence of a long-run relationship of Japanese interest rate with center 
country’s rates through the interwar period suggests the enduring influence of the gold 
standard. 43 Japanese policymakers were not free from the Golden Fetters after 
formally departing from the gold standard. They were not able to pursue monetary 
policy independent from the international capital markets. The choice for Japanese 
policymakers in the beginning of 1930s was NOT whether to peg or to float their 
currency; rather the choice was to what and at which level to peg their currency. 
Japanese policymakers decided to peg the pound-sterling.44 That implied that 
the Japanese monetary policy was to be dependent on the British monetary policy. It 
was a right decision, given the early departure of Britain from the gold standard and 
the greater possibility for easy monetary policy in Britain than in the United States. 
And that decision contributed early recovery of Japanese economy. Takahashi and his 
colleagues contributed to early recovery of Japanese economy, not because they pursued 
independent monetary policy, rather, because they followed easy monetary policy of 
                                                  
43  One might argue that such a relationship could be the result of synchronization of 
business cycles rather than the result of currency peg. I do not exclude such a possibility, 
but narratives indicate the importance of currency peg rather than synchronization of 
business cycles. 
44  In this regard, Japan can be classified de-facto in pound-sterling bloc after the 
breakdown of the international gold standard.  24
Britain. 
  Japan was a small and open economy in the interwar period. Japan was 
indebted to foreign investors for foreign-denominated debts. Japan needed to earn 
foreign money to service its debts. The one-shot devaluation of the currency was a 
possible policy choice. On the other hand, Japan needed to avoid capital flight in the 
midst of the international financial crisis. Imposing capital control was another choice. 
Still, Japan had to show the credibility of its policy and currency to the international 
investors. 
  Hamilton [1988] describes the destructive power of international capital flows 
during the final stage of the gold standard. In such a situation, the policy choice for the 
policymakers in a small and open economy was limited. They needed to peg their 
currency to some other currency at a level that would be appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
  The Japanese experience during the interwar period is different from the 
standard Keynesian explanation of a closed economy. Rather, the story resembles the 
emerging economies in the currency crisis of late 1990s. Once forced to depart from a 
peg system by the contagious effect of international capital flows, the policymakers 
devalued their currency in one shot, and then tried to stabilize the currency at the new, 
equilibrium level. In doing so, the policymakers continued to pay attention to the 
international financial market. 
  I add a notation about the timing of the structural change in the long-run 
relationship between Japanese and American interest rates. There are two events 
which might be associated with the structural change. One possibility is the start of the 
underwriting of new issues of government bonds by BOJ in November 1932. Bank of 
Japan drastically increased the amount of open market operation by means of 
government bonds around the end of 1932. Another possibility is the economic  25
turbulence in the United States in the beginning of 1933 which eventually led to the 
American departure from the gold standard. 
  It is reasonable to assume that the structural change with the American rate 
was associated with the American event rather than the Japanese domestic event. If 
one assume that the Japanese domestic events, such as the start of BOJ underwriting of 
government bonds was the cause of structural change with the American rate, then the 
event would cause a similar structural change to the relationship with the British rate. 
I find no such structural change with the British rate. 
So far, I have set aside the conduct of fiscal policy. I will explore it in future 
study. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
I have found evidence of the enduring effects of the gold standard after the 
departure of Japan in December 1931, as before the return in January 1930, both in 
qualitative materials and quantitative data. During the gold standard period in 1930-31 
and during the suspension period in the 1920s, Japanese policymakers sacrificed 
monetary policy autonomy in order to stabilize the exchange rate and to maintain free 
capital movements. In 1932, the policymakers followed the decline in foreign interest 
rates rather than conducted an autonomous monetary policy even after departing from 
the gold standard. 
In theory, a national policymaker is able to conduct autonomous monetary 
policy under the flexible exchange rate system. In reality, Japanese policymakers 
seemed to be still obsessed by the Golden Fetters even after departing from the gold 
standard. Japan experienced a decline in its long-term interest rate without closing its 
domestic capital market. Rather, the policymakers followed the developments in the 
international market.  26
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Sources: Bank of Japan; Tokyo Bankers Association.
note: Bills discounted and certificates of lending are reported by members of Tokyo Bankers 
       Association.
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Sources: Tokyo Bankers Association;
              NBER, Macrohistory Database, http://nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/.
Note: Data are interest rates on "bills discounted" for Japan and Britain, and on 
         "commercial papers" for the United States.
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Table 1. Unit Root Tests for Short-term Interest Rates
(Sample period: Jan.1919-Dec.1938; Number of observations: 240)
Japan
bills discounted certificates of lending
(level)
ADF -3.710 ** (9) -4.054 *** (5)
PP -3.929 ** -4.236 ***
(first differnce)
ADF -5.560 *** (8) -4.134 *** (5)
PP -10.948 *** -18.032 ***
Britain and the Unites States
Britain (bills discounted) United States (commercial papers)
(level)
ADF -3.549 ** (2) -2.832 (1)
PP -3.027 -2.742
(first difference)
ADF -6.836 *** (4) -9.982 *** (0)
PP -11.006 *** -10.035 ***
Notes: 1.Tests are employed on the formula with a constant and a trend term for level data, and without them for first difference data.
ɹɹɹɹ2."***", "**" and "*" indicate rejection of a unit root in 1, 5, and 10 percent level of significance, respectively.
ɹɹɹɹ3.numbers in parenthesis indicate lag orders for ADF tests. The lag orders are determined by being iteratively reduced from 12
ɹɹɹɹɹ to the order at which the longest lag term is statistically significant.
         4.The critical values are from Table 10.A.2 of Fuller[1996]  for ADF tests, and from Mackinnon[1996] for PP tests. 
Table 2. Unit Root Tests for Long-term Interest Rates
(Sample period: Jan.1919-Dec.1938; Number of observations: 240)






PP    
(first differnce)
ADF   	
   	
   	

PP      
Notes: 1.Tests are employed on the formula with a constant and a trend term for level data, and without them for first difference data.
ɹɹɹɹ2."***", "**" and "*" indicate rejection of a unit root in 1, 5, and 10 percent level of significance, respectively.
ɹɹɹɹ3.numbers in parenthesis indicate lag orders for ADF tests. The lag orders are determined by being iteratively reduced from 12
ɹɹɹɹɹ to the order at which the longest lag term is statistically significant.
         4.The critical values are from Table 10.A.2 of Fuller[1996]  for ADF tests, and from Mackinnon[1996] for PP tests. 
Table 3.  Granger Causality Tests (F-Statistics)
Dependent Valiable Japan Britain United States
Independent ValirablBritain United States Japan United States Japan Britain
Max lags
1 4.94 ** 6.17 ** 0.96 16.82 *** 0.99 17.89 ***
2 13.87 *** 11.58 *** 4.70 ** 19.10 *** 8.71 *** 28.03 ***
3 12.89 *** 10.89 *** 9.93 *** 20.78 *** 8.61 *** 29.32 ***
4 12.69 *** 11.92 *** 11.57 *** 21.47 *** 8.14 *** 35.34 ***
5 13.16 *** 18.53 *** 12.62 *** 23.33 *** 8.50 *** 36.73 ***
6 17.06 *** 18.78 *** 17.63 *** 32.43 *** 13.49 *** 44.07 ***
Notes: 1.Tests are employed with the formula including self-lags, which are not reported in the table.
ɹɹɹɹ2."***"and "**" indicate statistical significance at 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.
Table 4. Cointegration Tests (Engle-Granger)
Dependent variable: Japan ("Ko-go" 5 percent bond for the long-term interest rate, bills discounted for the short-term interest rate)
Independent variables: Constant term and Great Britain (Consols/bills discounted) / Constant term and United States (Treasury)
Sample period: January 1919-December 1938, Number of observations: 240
Long-tern interest rate Short-term interest rate
Britain (Consols) United States (Treasury) Britain (Bills Discounted)
ADF statistics -2.902 ( 1 ) ** -1.949 ( 11 ) -2.313 ( 2 )
Notes: 1. The table shows the results of ADF tests on the residuals of ordinary least square regressions (the Engle-Granger test).
              The ordinary least square regressions are conducted in the formula below:
           2. The critical values are from Table IIa of Phillips and Ouliaris [1990]. "**" indicates statistical significance at 5 percent level.
           3. Figures in parentheses show the lag order. The lag orders are determined by being iteratively reduced from 12
ɹɹɹɹɹ    to the order at which the longest lag term is statistically significant.
, , t t b t e R R + + + λ µ
Table 5. Cointegration Tests with A Structural Change (Gregory-Hansen)
Dependent variable: Japan ("Ko-go" 5 percent bond)
Independent variables: Constant term and United States (Treasury)
Sample period: January 1919-December 1938, Number of observations: 240
United States (Treasury)
ADF
* -4.817  + [ Dec. 1932 ]
Zt
* -4.701  + [ Jan. 1933 ]
Za
* -38.642  --
Notes: 1. The table shows residual-based cointegration test statistics of "regime change" (C/S) presented by Gregory and Hansen (1996).
              The "regime change" (C/S) is described as below;
              Dt has a value of zero before and at the time of the structural change; Dt has a value of one after the structural change.
           2. Dates in brackets show the time points when the structural change occurs.
           3. The critical values are from Table I of Gragory and Hansen [1996]. "+" indicates statistical significance at 10 percent level.
, , 2 , 1 2 1 t t t b t b t t e D R R D R + + + + = λ λ µ µ
Table 6.  Estimation Results of Japanese Interest Rate on International Base Rate (Error Correction Model)
Dependent variable: Japan ("Ko-go" 5 percent bond)
Sample period: January 1919-December 1938, Number of observations: 240
Rb: Britain (Consols) Rb: United States (Treasury)
a) b) c) d)
α -0.001 ( -0.30 ) -0.002 ( -0.38 ) -0.002 ( -0.41 ) -0.002 ( -0.42 )
β1 0.287 ( 4.72 ) *** 0.299 ( 4.89 ) *** 0.322 ( 5.25 ) *** 0.358 ( 5.90 ) ***
γ0 0.115 ( 2.44 ) **  --  -- 0.060 ( 1.24 ) 0.052 ( 1.09 )
γ1 0.053 ( 1.08 ) 0.057 ( 1.14 ) -0.055 ( -1.12 ) -0.062 ( -1.31 )
ω -0.070 ( -3.59 ) *** -0.074 ( -3.79 ) *** -0.056 ( -3.39 ) *** -0.123 ( -4.96 ) ***
half-life 9.61 9.01 12.00 5.27
(cointegrating vector) (cointegrating vector)
σ -3.161 ( -39.63 ) *** -3.161 ( -39.63 ) *** -3.693 ( -46.36 ) *** -4.681 ( -56.20 ) ***
σΠ  --  --  --  --  --  -- 0.068 ( 0.33 )
θ 0.549 ( 28.54 ) *** 0.549 ( 28.54 ) *** 0.476 ( 22.40 ) *** 0.253 ( 12.36 ) ***
θΠ  --  --  --  --  --  -- -0.176 ( -2.52 ) **
adj. R
2 0.171 0.153 0.127 0.171
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
                "***", "**", and "*" indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
            2.Dt has a value of zero before and in December 1932; otherwise, Dt has a value of one.
            3. In all cases of the error correction model estimation, lag orders are chosen to be 1 by Schwarz information criteria.
            4."Half-life" means the half-life of the shock based on the adjustment speed, ω.
            5.Cointegrating vectors are calculated by the dynamic OLS method. Lag orders are chosen by Schwarz infromation criteria.
                                  in column d):
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